Abstract: This paper reports results from a field experiment in Uganda. Whether a mosquito net was acquired as an in-kind transfer or purchased with a cash transfer who within the household used the net. Nets received in kind were more likely to be allocated to those members of the household most vulnerable to malaria, whereas purchased nets tended to be used by the household's primary income earners. The effect was strongest for free nets received by the mother, increasing the probability that all children five and younger slept under nets relative to when nets had been purchased by the father. The fact that mode of receipt plays an important role in intra-household allocation can be used to more effectively target interventions at the sub-household level.
Introduction
Malaria kills over one million people annually, 85 percent of them African children under the age of five (World Health Organization, 2004) . The use of insecticide treated mosquito nets (ITNs) has been shown to reduce allcause child mortality across a range of transmission environments by 17 percent (Lengeler 2004) and is considered the most cost-effective available strategy for control of the disease (Breman et al. 2006) The appropriate mechanism of ITN deliveryfree distribution versus some degree of cost recoveryis hotly debated (Muller and Jahn 2004) . While mass distributions of free nets to families with young children have recently been undertaken in a number of African countries, this policy is widely considered fiscally unsustainable 1 . Some also argue that paying for goods motivates people to use them (PSI 2006) , and indeed there is evidence that higher prices screen out those who will not use health goods consistently (Ashraf et al.
2007).
Although public health messages emphasize that children should use nets, some studies have found that when a household does not have enough nets to cover all members, the nets they have are often used by adults rather than children (Korenromp et al. 2003; Mugisha and Arinaitwe 2003) . In this paper, I analyze the determinants of individual net usage, including who received it and whether the net was purchased or received in kind.
The way in which mosquito nets are distributed varies across and even within countries. However, comparing the intrahousehold allocation of nets across program boundaries is problematic because of spatial variation in both malaria endemicity (which affects adult immunity to malaria) and cultural norms. Using an experimental approach, it is possible to randomize the mode of distribution within one locality and thus to cleanly identify the effect of the distribution policy on who uses the nets.
I conducted a field experiment in an area of seasonal malaria transmission in western Uganda. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either cash or ITNs, and had the opportunity to trade the ITNs for cash or cash for ITNs. In unannounced night-time checks of net usage three weeks later, those nets that had been received for free were more likely to be used by the most vulnerable household members, while purchased nets were used more often by the primary income earners. The effect was strongest when free nets were received by the mother of the household's children.
In the following two sections, I review the literature on behavioral phenomena related to the allocation of mosquito nets and household economics of malaria. Section 4 discusses the conceptual framework. I outline the methods of the field experiment in Section 5. Section 6 describes results of the experiment, and Section 7 concludes.
Intrahousehold decision-making and behavioral anomalies
The most basic microeconomic model assumes that the household behaves as a unitary decision-maker and pools income from all sources to maximize a single utility function. Under this model, the intrahousehold allocation of a good will not depend on the identity of the household member who receives or purchases it, nor will the form in which a transfer is received determine its use. However, empirical studies of intrahousehold allocation routinely reject the unitary nature of household decision-making. Further, the experimental and behavioral economics literatures document systematic ways in which individuals behave inconsistently with the assumptions of neoclassical economics. Deviations from the standard model at both the individual and household level imply that the way in which resources are obtained may influence their allocation.
Mental Accounts
One phenomenon that is well established but runs counter to standard theory is that income has limited fungibility (Thaler 1999) . People tend to organize financial transactions into separate mental accounts linked to different needs, so that how money is spent depends on how it was acquired. For example, child tax benefits increase expenditures on children's clothing even though there are no rules about how these transfers should be spent (Kooreman 2000) . Using experimental methods, O'Curry (1997) found that "frivolous" windfalls such as lottery winnings were more likely to be put to "frivolous" uses such as eating out, whereas more "serious" windfalls such as tax returns were spent on less discretionary expenses such as paying bills. In a rural African setting, Duflo and Udry (2004) showed that income from certain crops was associated with expenditures on children's education and food while that from others was associated with private and adult goods, even when the two income streams were under a particular individual's control. They hypothesized that this result was due to the threat of social sanctions against "misuse" of funds traditionally allocated to basic needs.
Responsibility and property rights
Another finding, which may be seen as a particular type of mental accounting, is the association of property rights with responsibility. Boyce et al. (1992) ran an experiment in which subjects bid to buy or sell a houseplant in either a 'kill' or 'not kill' condition. In each condition, subjects were divided into a selling and a buying group. Buyer (sellers) were asked to state their maximum willingness to pay (minimum willingness to accept cash) for a plant. In the kill condition, all plants left over after bidding (in the selling group) or sold back to experimenters (in the buying group) were killed. In the not kill condition, plants were not killed. Selling prices in the kill condition were much higher than in the not kill condition, but bids to buy plants were only slightly affected by the increased moral responsibility for the plants suggested by the kill condition. The authors attributed this result to the connection between property rights and responsibility.
In a similar vein, Irwin (1994), using hypothetical questions on willingness to pay or accept payment for changes in environmental states and private goods, found that the average price difference between buying and selling modes is higher for the environmental amenities. Irwin argued that moral or public good attributes are more salient in the decision to accept payment, whereas personal gain is the main consideration when deciding whether to pay for something.
In the present study, if a parent is given a net and told about the particular vulnerability of children to malaria, the connection of that net to child health may be more explicit than if the parent is given money with which a net may be purchased, even when the same message is received. The association of responsibility with property rights may exacerbate this effect. In a society where household responsibilities are largely determined by traditional gender roles, the effect may be gender-specific.
Gender accounts
The assumption that mothers care more about their children than fathers do underlies many programs aimed at increasing child welfare by targeting resources to women. Stated preferences have been shown to differ systematically by gender (Kusago and Barham 2001) , and the share of income earned by women is indeed positively associated with expenditures on child health across a wide range of settings, suggesting that married couples keep separate accounts (Thomas 1990; Bourguignon et al. 1993; Browning et al. 1994; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Phipps and Burton 1998) .
Such studies do not generally control for how income is derived. Duflo's (2003) paper showing that the gender of old-age pensioners in South Africa affects child health is a notable exception. In general, if the mental account to which a particular income stream accrues is correlated with gender, such analyses may overstate the impact of gender-specific preferences. Thomas (1990) showed that unearned income under the mother's control has a much greater effect on child survival than does father's income, but noted that the composition of unearned income differs markedly by gender, with women deriving a much greater share from pensions and social security relative to men, who earn a greater portion from financial and physical assets. Hoddinott and Haddad's (1995) analysis relied on attributing certain crops to male and female control, leaving open the possibility that income from particular crops (perhaps those usually under female control) is associated with public goods expenditures as found by Duflo and Udry (2004) . Using an experimental approach, it is possible to empirically distinguish the effects of gender and the behavioral effects of receiving a good in kind. Doing so in this paper, I find that both effects matter, and that their interaction has a significant impact on children's use of a health good.
Household economics of malaria
Malaria is caused by a parasite that requires both human and mosquito hosts to complete its life cycle. If not treated properly, malaria parasites can remain in the human body long after symptoms subside, causing repeated episodes of illness. With treatment and avoidance of re-exposure, malaria can be cleared from the system completely. In East Africa, the most common species of malaria-transmitting mosquito bites primarily late at night, so that sleeping under a mesh mosquito net is a highly effective means of avoiding infection.
While adults in malarious regions have typically acquired some immunity to malaria through repeated exposure over the course of their lives, they may still suffer symptoms and even death from the disease. Adults' symptoms are more serious in regions where malaria transmission is seasonal, since immunity diminishes after several months without an infective bite. However the risk of serious malaria and death is highest for young children and pregnant women across transmission environments (Snow et al. 2003, p. 11-12) .
Both the private and public costs of malaria are substantial, and lost labor time often accounts for the largest portion of the private cost of the disease (Cropper et al. 2004 ). This implies a tradeoff between minimizing the income lost to malaria and minimizing the risk that a household member dies of the disease, particularly in areas of lower transmission intensity.
Studies of particular programs in which nets were given for free to mothers of small children suggest that this is an effective way of targeting nets to children. Guyatt and Ochola (2003) and Dupas (2005) both found that 85 percent of nets given to pregnant women or mothers of young children were used by their intended recipients.
Guyatt and Ochola, studying two districts in Kenya, noted a lower rate of net use among newborns in the district with lower malaria transmission intensity (80 vs. 91%) where adults tend to suffer more serious symptoms.
On the other hand, studies using a broader sample of households, among which many nets are likely to have been purchased through market channels, give inconsistent results on children's net use. Data from the 2000-2001 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in Uganda, where there had been no widespread distribution of free nets, show that the coverage of young children in that country was largely incidental to sharing a bed with an adult: children who slept in the same bed as an adult were 22 times more likely to be sleeping under a net than other children (Mugisha and Arinaitwe 2003) . A cross-country study using DHS data from 12 African countries revealed that children were no more or less likely than adults to use nets (Korenromp et al. 2003) .
However more recent work, conducted in five African countries after widespread free distribution of nets, found that young children were prioritized for net use (Baume et al 2005) .
Most of the above studies relied on questions about who slept under a net the previous night. To the degree that respondents believe survey staff have preferences about the allocation of nets, there is a chance such recall responses could be biased. The only exception is Alaii et al. (2003) , who physically checked net usage during the night. Alaii et al are also the only authors to investigate reasons why young children do not use nets. Even though all study participants were given enough nets for their entire household, under-fives were 14 percent less likely to use a net than others. In this setting of year-round high transmission intensity (and resulting relatively strong immunity outside early childhood), primary reasons reported for lack of net use by under-fives were temperature and the disruption of usual sleeping arrangements. The present research was conducted in an area of low transmission intensity, where adults typically suffer the symptoms of malaria if infected and economic factors may therefore play a stronger role in the intrahousehold allocation decision.
Conceptual framework
Whether a child sleeps under an ITN requires first that one or more ITNs are acquired by the household and second that the child is given one of these to use. Suppose a child is cared for by a guardian i. The guardian has an opportunity to purchase a number of nets n between 0 and N, where N is the number of nets required to cover all household members. The probability CU B that the child sleeps under an ITN when these are available for purchase at price p to guardian i is equal to the sum over the possible number of nets of the probability of buying n nets, multiplied by the conditional probability that the child uses one of these n nets, given that n have been purchased. Thus:
For each guardian i, the decision to purchase a given number of nets depends upon i's willingness to pay for n nets and the price p. Willingness to pay is in turn a function of i's cash resources W i , as well as individual and household attributes X i and Z h , respectively. The probability of the child using a net given that n nets are purchased depends upon the number of nets purchased, the characteristics of the guardian who purchased the nets and of the household, and the guardian's willingness to pay for nets. As shown by Ashraf, Berry and Shapiro's recent work (2007), willingness to pay for a good may be associated with greater intensity of use. As household members often share sleeping places and ITNs are large enough for several people to use, intensity of use in this context means first that the nets are used at all, and second that a greater number of individuals sleep under a given number of nets. The probability of a child gaining access to a net when guardian i receives a transfer of N nets in kind can similarly be written as:
where retain in is equal to one if n of the nets received by the guardian are retained by the household and zero otherwise. Retention depends on both guardians' willingness to accept (WTA) payment in exchange for n nets as well as the resale price p that could be obtained. The endowment effect implies that WTP in and WTA in may differ.
Others have found weak evidence that the act of paying influences product usage, but no evidence that that the price paid has any effect (ibid.). By writing (1) and (2) as separate equations, I explicitly allow for the possibility that paying affects usage, including intensity and allocation among household members. Conditional on willingness to pay, however, the price actually paid does not enter the allocation decision. This assumption is critical to the empirical strategy described below, since it allows the decision to purchase a net to be estimated separately from the allocation decision.
In a separate paper, colleagues and I use data from the experiment described here to show that, due to both wealth and endowment effects, nets much are much more likely to be retained if received for free than purchased out of own resources (Hoffmann et al. 2007 ). The present paper focuses on the probability that a child uses an ITN given that at least one net is purchased or received in kind, holding the wealth transfer constant. In particular, I ask if the probability of a child using an ITN, conditional on the household owning at least one net, depends on the identity of the household member who acquired it and whether the net was purchased with a cash transfer or received as an in-kind transfer.
The effect of gender on the allocation decision may be due to differences in the way that men and women value children's health or to differences in the degree of control men and women have over household income. If men control a grater share of the income earned by other household members than women, one would expect the variation in individual incomes to play a stronger role in men's ITN allocation decisions, independent of genderspecific preferences over child health. The behavior of single mothers may shed light on the relative importance of budgetary control versus gender-specific preferences. With the caveat that single and married mothers are likely to differ along other dimensions, the fact that the former have complete control over household expenditures may at least partially explain any differences between their intra-household allocation decisions and those of married women.
Within a gender category, any difference in ITN allocation that results from the way in which the net was acquired, that is, the difference between
, can be attributed to behavioral phenomena, in particular endowment and mental accounting effects.
Setting and baseline data collection
At the time data were collected in October and November of 2006 there had been no large-scale distribution of free or subsidized ITNs in Uganda. Conventional nets were available in weekly rural markets at a price of approximately $2.72 US, and higher-quality nets bundled with treatment kits were available in the nearest urban center for twice this price.
2 The long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLIN) offered through the experiment described here were not commercially available in Uganda. These nets are much more durable than commercially available nets, with an estimated 5-year lifespan (compared to about one year even for the highest quality conventional ITNs), and do not need to be retreated with insecticide yearly as do other ITNs.
Mbarara district was chosen for its seasonal transmission pattern of malaria and resultant low adult immunity, allowing identification of the income versus child health tradeoff. To ensure ease of tracking project nets, the sub-county with the lowest baseline net ownership per capita was chosen. 3 The experiment was conducted in Rubagano and Kimuli, villages 10 kilometers apart with populations of approximately 1300 and 900
respectively.
Households with children aged up to five years or a pregnant woman were eligible to participate in the study. A list of all households in each village meeting eligibility criteria was provided by the village chairmen. In order to separately identify the effects of gender-specific preferences and control over income, households were stratified by the marital status of the head. All 42 of the single-headed households identified, 39 of which were headed by women, were selected for the initial sample. An additional 100 dual-headed households were randomly selected to augment this group. Respondents were not necessarily parents of the children under their care: 12 percent of the households interviewed contained at least one child aged 5 or younger who was neither the son nor daughter of either head. All of these children were somehow related to the respondent.
A questionnaire covering demographic information, malaria history and income-generating activities of each member of the family as well as household consumption expenditures was administered during an initial household visit. Which members usually shared a bed or sleeping place was also recorded.
Respondents were asked to recall food consumption over the past week and non-durables and services purchased over the past month. Average consumption value per capita among the sample was US $0.65 per day, excluding expenditures on health care. While values are not strictly comparable because of differences in data collection methods, this is close to the US $0.59 daily per capita private consumption expenditure for Uganda reported by the World Bank for the previous year. Almost all households in the sample derived at least some of their living from farming, and home produced goods accounted for 43 percent of total consumption value on average.
Respondents were asked to state the hours worked by each member of the household on own farm, livestock, non-farm enterprises during the past week, how much it would cost to pay someone to do this work, and who in the household primarily controlled the income derived through this activity. The median reported hourly value for each activity was calculated and this activity-specific wage was multiplied by the number of hours worked.
This imputed value was added to the reported wages earned through paid jobs during the past week to calculate individual income.
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Respondents reported significant expenditures as a result of malaria: the mean and median costs incurred as a result of the most recent malaria episode (including transport) were $13.55 and $5.45 respectively. Eighty-seven percent of individuals were reported to suffer from malaria at least once each year, and 79 percent of respondents claimed to know someone who had died of the disease. Admissions data obtained from the subcounty local health clinic showed that over the past year, 40 percent of visits by children younger than 5 years, and 54 percent of visits by older patients were malaria-related. Only six of the 142 households interviewed owned any mosquito nets at the time of the initial household visit. Of the 15 individuals in these households using nets, three were five years or younger, and all three were sharing the net with at least one adult.
Experimental design

Treatment assignment and attrition
Either the husband or wife in each of the dual-headed households was randomly selected to represent the household in a bidding session. Half of the participants in each category (husbands, wives and single heads)
were randomly assigned to a cash transfer treatment, the other half to an in-kind transfer treatment. Bidding sessions were held separately for the two treatments, with seven sessions for each. Table 1a shows the number of participants in each treatment by headship and gender.
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As shown in Table 1b, all households sent a representative to the bidding session, but 3 households selected for the uncompensated treatment failed to participate. Participants who missed their assigned session were allowed to attend a later session. An effort was made to reassign the person to a session of the same treatment, however this was not always possible. Staff and respondents were unaware until a session began whether it would be an in-kind or cash transfer session. The reassignment of individuals between treatments is therefore unlikely to have introduced bias.
A significant number of households sent a representative other than the one randomly assigned. This person was asked to find the assigned participant. If the representative insisted that the assigned participant was absent and would not be able to attend an alternative session, other community members were asked to verify this. In several instances, others contradicted the claim of the household representative and the intended respondent was eventually found. However for 9 of the 139 participating households, a non-randomly assigned individual participated. These households are dropped from the analysis. 6 An additional 11 households containing no children aged five years or younger were dropped from the analysis.
Two of these were included in the initial sample because they contained a woman who was or might soon become pregnant. Although an effort was made to replace households not meeting the eligibility criteria, lack of eligibility was not always discovered before the interview was initiated, resulting in the inclusion of nine ineligible households in the initial sample. As shown in Table 1c , the vast majority of these were single headed households. Table 2 reports the means of variables from the baseline survey for the final sample of the two treatments and for each of the three gender/headship categories. The only variable differs significantly (p=0.099) between treatments is the number of children aged 5 years or younger, with the mean among households in the in-kind treatment 2.23 versus 1.91 in the cash transfer treatment. This is potentially problematic since the outcome of interest is the proportion of household children sleeping under a mosquito net, which is likely to be easier to achieve in households with fewer children. I therefore include the number of children as a control in the models below, and note that any bias induced through this imbalance is likely to result in a lower proportion of children using nets in the in-kind treatment. Notably, respondents perceive children aged 5 years and younger to suffer malaria less frequently than individuals aged 15 to 59 (p<0.05).
The gender and headship categories reveal many differences between single and dual-headed households.
Notably, single heads are much older than married heads, and have significantly less education. Many of the children cared for by these individuals are grandchildren or other relatives. Due to asymmetric attrition across treatments within this group, single heads are over-represented in the in-kind transfer treatment.
Experimental procedures
Households in each treatment were assigned a transfer of one, two or three 190 by 180 centimeter Olyset brand 7 nets (or the wholesale price of one, two or three nets). For each household, the number of nets (or cash equivalent) was the minimum of the number of distinct sleeping places in the dwelling, the number of household members divided by two and rounded up to the next integer, and three. Separate sessions were held for households receiving one net, two nets, and three nets, and for those receiving a cash transfer of $7.63, net, $15.26, and $22.89. These cash transfers were sufficient to pay the maximum possible price of $7.63 for one, two or three nets respectively.
At the beginning of each session, all participants in the session were given either nets cash equivalent in local currency, according to their randomly assigned treatment. They were told that this gift of nets or cash was compensation for participation in the study, and that they could exchange or use this compensation as they wished. Participants in all sessions were read the same statement about malaria and the relative vulnerability of young children and pregnant women to the disease. This included the following passage about the particular vulnerability of pregnant women and children (see the appendix for the full script):
Malaria is more likely to be serious for young children and pregnant women. In Uganda malaria is the number one killer of children under 5 years, and is responsible for 6 of every 10 miscarriages.
Grown men and women who are not pregnant may also become sick with malaria and may die, but they are less likely to die of malaria than young children and pregnant women. Severe malaria can also cause mental retardation, blindness, and deafness in children. Staff demonstrated how to hang a mosquito net and tuck it under the corners of the bed or sleeping mat. A villager who had received six of the same type of LLIN through a UN project several months earlier told the group that these nets were effective at killing insects and had prevented malaria in her family during the time they had used them. Participants then had the opportunity to exchange nets for cash or cash for nets using the Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism (Becker et al. 1964 ). This mechanism is commonly used in experimental economics because it is incentive compatible: participants maximize their utility by revealing their true willingness to pay or willingness to accept value.
Three non-confidential practice rounds using food items and pencils instead of mosquito nets were conducted before the nets could be exchanged for cash or cash for nets in the final round. In the in-kind sessions, participants were given food and pencils which they could keep or sell. In the cash transfer sessions participants were given cash which they could keep or use to purchase these goods.
For each practice round, as well as the final ITN round, the procedure was as follows. One of the experimenters explained the bidding procedure, and for each item, told participants the possible prices that could be drawn as he placed one ping-pong ball representing each of these possible prices in a bucket. For all sessions, the possible prices were uniformly distributed from $0.54 to $7.63 in increments of $0.54. Participants were given tokens representing currency, which they placed in envelopes to indicate their buying bids or selling offers. In this way, those in the cash transfer treatment indicated the maximum they were willing to pay and those in the in-kind treatment, the minimum they were willing to accept, for three items (in the three net sessions), two items (in the three net and two net sessions), and one item (in all the sessions), by placing the currency tokens in an envelope and passing this to one of the experimenters, who recorded the bids. Allowing different bids for the first, second and third nets allowed observation of the marginal, rather than the average, willingness to pay for each net. Staff were available to assist with bids if needed, but participants were asked to keep their net bids as confidential as possible.
After all bids had been recorded (and in the practice rounds displayed), one of the participants drew a ball to select the price. In cash transfer sessions, participants who had bid at least as much as the drawn price for a given number of goods exchanged cash for that number of goods. For example, in the ITN round of a three-net value cash transfer session where the price drawn was p, if a participant bid at least 3p for three nets, he would buy all three nets at the total price of 3p. If he bid less than 3p for three nets but at least 2p for two items, he would buy two nets for 2p, and if he bid less than 2p for two but more than p for one, he would buy one net at price p. Finally, if he bid less than 3p, less than 2p, and less than p for three, two and one net, respectively, he would keep the cash and receive no nets. Transactions for the in-kind transfer sessions followed the same logic, with participants selling back the nets they had been given at the randomly drawn price. 9 The number of nets offered, number of participants, and price realizations for each session in the in-kind and cash transfer treatments are reported in Tables 3a and 3b respectively.
Before consenting to participate, participants in the in-kind and cash transfer groups were told that if they opted to purchase or retain any nets, survey staff or village leaders would visit them at night to see how these were being used. They were not informed of the date on which this visit would occur. Home visits by community leaders were conducted between 9 pm and midnight on one night per village, three weeks after the bidding sessions. A few days later, again on a single night per village, survey staff visited the homes of those who had requested that an outsider conduct the net use check. During these visits, the net usage of each household member was recorded.
Results
Net purchase and retention
Respondents' willingness to pay for and sell nets received in kind is the subject of a separate paper (Hoffmann et al. 2007 ). The following discussion concerns primarily the intra-household allocation of nets that were purchased or received for free and retained. However, a brief description of bids and resulting distribution of nets across treatment groups is in order. Consistent with the endowment effect, those in the in-kind transfer treatment entered bids higher by $1.22 on average than those in the cash transfer treatment, resulting in a greater number of households possessing any nets in the in-kind group (Table 4) . Even though the bids in the in-kind group were high on average, the value of the transfer was slightly higher for the group receiving cash, since the average value of nets across all participants, at $6.67, was less than the value of the per-net cash transfer of $7.63, and because when the drawn price was less than the transfer value, the remainder of cash was retained.
Assuming that children's health is a normal good, this asymmetry would lead to a greater number of children using nets in the cash transfer group.
While 98% of households in the in kind transfer treatment retained at least one net, only 84% of those in the cash transfer group purchased at least one. This creates a sample selection problem when considering usage among only those households owning one or more nets. Willingness to pay differs across treatment groups as a result of the endowment effect. Households that are particularly susceptible to the endowment effect, who happen to be assigned to the in the in-kind transfer treatment, will enter higher selling bids than average in this group, and are therefore more likely to be left with nets. But these same households, if assigned to the cash transfer group, will not enter higher than average bids. The selection mechanism into the sub-sample for which net usage is observed therefore differs across treatments, invalidating the original random assignment. I address this problem by using a selection model, detailed below. Consider first the proportion of children using nets in each treatment group.
Child net usage
Considering only those who possessed at least one net after transfers were given and exchanges allowed, the number of nets per member is almost equal across conditions, with 0.40 nets per member in the cash transfer treatment and 0.42 among those receiving the in-kind transfer. The proportion of children aged 5 and younger using nets in the in-kind treatment is 81.4% versus 69.6% among the cash transfer households (significantly different at p<0.1), suggesting that the intra-household allocation decision depends upon the way in which a net was acquired (Tables 5a and 5b ). Splitting the sample by gender, the difference in children's usage across treatment is significant only among women: 66.1% of children five years and younger use a net if a female guardian purchases at least one, whereas 82.8% percent of such children use a net if a female guardian is given nets and retains at least one, with the 16.7% percentage point difference significant at p<0.1. This suggests a stronger responsibility-inducing effect of an in-kind transfer on women, perhaps due to their role of caring for children in the household. The point estimate is indistinguishable between single and married women, though not significantly different from zero for either due to the smaller sample sizes. When a male guardian had purchased the nets, the proportion of children using one of these was 75.5%, compared with 78.7% percent when the nets had been received in kind and retained, a small and statistically insignificant difference. The share of children using nets when the nets were received by married men (combining treatments), at 76.7%, is not significantly different from the 77.3% of children using nets when the recipients were married women.
Selection model
To explore how household and participant-level attributes affect child ITN usage, I turn to a multivariate model in which the dependent variable is the proportion of household children aged 5 years or younger sleeping under a net. To deal with the selection problem noted above, I employ a Heckman selection model. Price is randomly drawn in both treatments. Conditional on willingness to pay for the first net purchased or last net sold, price determines whether any nets are retained by the household. Rather than condition on the marginal bid or offer for the first net, which, in combination with price deterministically predicts retention or purchase of at least one net and therefore leads to estimation problems, I use the marginal bid or offer value for the last net. For a household with the opportunity to purchase three nets, this is the willingness to pay for the third net; for a household receiving three nets in kind, this would be the offer price for the first net sold. These bids or offers do not deterministically predict selection in the way that the first marginal bids and offer do, but are highly first marginal bids and thus with selection. The selection equation should also condition on treatment, since there is an asymmetry in how nets are allocated when the buying bid equals the drawn price (a net is purchased) versus when the selling offer equals this price (a net is sold). However, including the treatment dummy in the selection equation causes the data to fail to converge. The omission of this variable may account for the unexpected negative sign on price in the selection equation. Using the assumption that the price paid does not affect usage, price is excluded from the second stage regression equation. Table 6a reports both stages of the selection model under two alternative specifications. Only dual-headed households are included in this model, since gender is not randomly assigned among the single-headed group.
The primary explanatory variables of interest are a treatment dummy indicating that the participant received free nets (as opposed to cash with which nets could be purchased), a dummy for gender of the participant, and the interaction of these terms. Specification (1) includes the treatment and gender dummy but not the interaction.
Both terms are positive but neither is significant. Specification (2) adds the interaction of the female head representing the household in the experiment, and receiving the nets in kind. The coefficient on this interaction is positive and strongly significant, indicating that children are more likely to use nets when these are received for free by the mother relative to when fathers receive nets for free, or either parent purchases nets.
Years of formal education of the male household head, and, to a lesser degree, educational attainment of the female head, increases the chance that young children use nets. The per capita consumption level of the household has an unexpected negative effect on net allocation, perhaps reflecting closer quarters and thus greater ease of sharing nets among the poor.
Noting that likelihood ratio tests for the models in Table 6a do not indicate that the selection process leads to bias, I also include a Tobit specification using only the households that retained or purchased at least one net.
The results from this model, reported in Table 6b , are qualitatively the same as those from the selection model.
Determinants of individual net usage
Next I explore the determinants of net allocation across individuals among the set of households that retain at least one net. A binary variable equal to one if the individual was using a net at the time of the night-time visit is regressed on individual and household characteristics using a probit model with standard errors clustered by household. Modeling sample selection in the same way as above leads to very similar results (not reported).
Explanatory variables of interest are the share of total household income earned by the individual, binary variables indicating that the individual was the participant who received the nets or cash transfer, whether the individual "usually gets malaria every year" according to the respondent in the baseline interview, age, a dummy for age less than five years, and another for age less than five years an not a child of the respondent. The number of nets owned by the household is included as a control.
The effect of income is significant only for male participants in the cash transfer treatment: within this group, earning all of the household's income leads to almost certain usage of a net. Similarly, among male households that purchased nets, all the participants used one of these. For women, too, having purchased a net with cash is a significant predictor of one's own usage, though the magnitude of this effect is smaller. Women in the cash transfer treatment are more likely to allocate nets to those household members perceived by the respondent in the baseline survey to 'usually suffer from malaria each year'. Recall from the discussion of baseline characteristics that adults are perceived as suffering from malaria more regularly than young children. Neither income, nor being the one to receive the transfer, nor perceived vulnerability as measured by suffering from malaria each year has any impact on usage when the transfer of nets is received in kind.
Rather, reflecting the message given to participants about the greater vulnerability of young children to malaria, the youngest are more likely to use nets received in kind. This effect holds across gender: the under-five dummy is significant in none of the subsets receiving the cash transfer groups, but all of the groups receiving the in-kind transfer. Perhaps reflecting the higher vulnerability of the elderly to illness, age is also a significant predictor of net use in the in-kind transfer treatment but not the cash transfer treatment; this is likewise consistent across gender.
Splitting the female sub-sample by household structure (Table 7b) leads to rather small sample sizes with some variables dropped due to perfect collinearity with the outcome. However, some differences between married and single women are apparent. First, usage of a net by the participant is much more frequent in the singleheaded group, with all single participants in the cash transfer group using nets, and a significant effect also for the in-kind net recipients. Married women, on the other hand, are no more likely to use the net by virtue of having received or purchased it. Instead, these women are more likely to allocate nets to those perceived to frequently suffer from malaria (in the cash treatment), older individuals and to young children. With the caveat that this is a small sub-sample, single women's behavior appears more similar to that of men than to married women, suggesting that differences in control over household resources may partially explain the differences between married men and women.
In general, model coefficients do not differ significantly among treatment and gender groups so firm conclusions can not be drawn from these comparisons. It is however suggestive that the determinants of allocation when nets are purchased (income, perceived frequency of illness, and own receipt) are rendered completely insignificant when nets are received in kind. We do not observe the allocation of nets without the message about child vulnerability, but it is worth noting that unless nets are received in-kind, young children are no more likely to use nets than other household members, suggesting that receiving this information has limited impact on behavior on its own.
Conclusions
The way in which a good is acquired may affect how it is used. In this paper, I have shown that the allocation of a purchased health good differs markedly from the allocation of the same good received as a transfer in kind.
When a mosquito net has been purchased, the decision of who will use that net appears to turn on an economic cost-benefit calculation, with income-earners and the individual purchasing the net prioritized for net use, as well as those perceived as most vulnerable to malaria. On the other hand, receiving a net in kind induces parents to allocate nets to children in accordance with the public health message accompanying net distribution. This effect is present for men as well as women, but the impact on child usage is strongest when nets are given to married women.
The health benefit of many goods, including mosquito nets, depend upon their allocation within the household.
It is broadly recognized that parents may have heterogeneous preferences and keep separate accounts, and these facts are generally taken into account in the design of health-promotion programs. Less well understood is the influence of psychological factors associated with the way in which goods are obtained, though this area is drawing increasing attention. The finding that intrahousehold allocation of goods is affected by the form of a transfer has implications for the design programs designed to target particular groups at the sub-household level.
Such programs may be appropriate if the preferences of household decision-makers are at odds with social preferences (for example, for child health or contraception), or if decision-makers misperceive relative vulnerability.
One important caveat which requires further investigation is the degree to which the knowledge of monitoring affected usage differentially among treatment arms. Indeed community-based monitoring is considered a highly effective strategy for increasing compliance with pharmaceutical regimens to treat tuberculosis (WHO, 1997).
The same may be true with usage of other health goods, including mosquito nets, and may be justified given positive externalities in malaria transmission reductions associated with high community-wide levels of insecticide treated net usage . Tables   Table 1a: Sample by headship, assigned treatment, and gender of assigned participant Standard errors are in parentheses. Tests of equality are between treatments (significance shown in column 1), between married men and women (significance shown in column 3, and between dual-headed and single-headed households (significance shown in column 5) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 5a : Proportion of children aged five years and younger using nets, by treatment, participant gender, and household headship, conditional on owning at least one net. 
(8) Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by household.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Being the individual who received the cash transfer perfectly determined net use among male participants.
12
There are only two individuals aged 5 years or younger who are not the participant's children in the male sub-sample. Both of these use nets so this variable perfectly predicts usage and is thus dropped from the model. 13 Being the one to receive cash perfectly predicts net use among single female heads receiving the cash transfer, as does suffering from malaria each year. In the free nets condition the perfect collinearity of perceived regularity of malaria illness is reversed: none of those perceived to be sick with the disease every year use a net. 14 All such children in the households of married women use nets.
Appendix: Experiment Scripts
A1. Compensation Statement
Buying Condition: The money you have been given is compensation for your participation in this study. You may use this for whatever you wish. Later today you will have an opportunity to exchange this cash for mosquito nets, but you are in no way obligated to do so.
Free Nets Condition:
The nets you have been given is compensation for your participation in this study. You may use these for whatever you wish. Later today you will have an opportunity to exchange these nets for cash, but you are in no way obligated to do so.
A2. Malaria Statement
Malaria is a serious, sometimes fatal disease that is spread through the bites of certain mosquitoes. The symptoms of malaria are fever, headache, weakness, vomiting, and loss of appetite. Children may also suffer convulsions, and adults may feel pains in their joints, dizziness and backache.
Malaria is more likely to be serious for young children and pregnant women. In Uganda malaria is the number one killer of children under 5 years, and is responsible for 6 of every 10 miscarriages. Grown men and women who are not pregnant may also become sick with malaria and may die, but they are less likely to die of malaria than young children and pregnant women. Severe malaria can also cause mental retardation, blindness, and deafness in children.
The mosquitoes that carry malaria usually bite late at night, so an effective way of avoiding malaria is to sleep under a mosquito net. Mosquito nets are especially effective for preventing malaria in young children, since children tend to stay in bed during the night when mosquitoes are biting.
Mosquito nets are more effective when they are treated with a chemical that kills mosquitoes but is safe for humans. Mosquitoes die when they land on such treated nets, so if there is a hole in the net, or an opening between the bed and the net in the net they are unlikely to find it. Also, there are fewer mosquitoes in the house to bite people not sleeping under nets or who leave temporarily their nets during the night. Most of the mosquito nets you can buy in the market are not treated with chemicals. You can buy chemicals to treat these nets which are effective for 6 months. Then the nets must be treated again.
Buying Condition: [hold up net and pass it around the room for inspection]
This mosquito net has been treated with special chemicals that are effective for 5 years. You will not need to treat this net again, even after washing it. Also, it is made from stronger threads than the mosquito nets found in the market, and will last much longer without tearing.
Free Nets Condition: [Everyone is has been given their own net(s), and are asked to inspect them]
The nets we have given you have been treated with special chemicals that are effective for 5 years. You will not need to treat your nets again, even after washing them. Also, these nets are made from stronger threads than the mosquito nets found in the market, and will last much longer without tearing. Each net is big enough to cover two single beds side by side.
All Conditions:
[demonstrate how the net should be hung over a bed]
A3. Bidding Scripts
Buying Condition: We are interested in finding out how much you would pay for (this net / two of these nets / three of these nets), and who in your family will use (it / them) if you don't have enough nets for everyone.
We will ask you to tell us the maximum price you are willing to pay for (one net / one and two nets / one, two, and three nets). I will then choose a price randomly. If the price you tell me is higher than the price I choose, you will give me the amount of money I have chosen and I will give you the net. If the price I choose is lower than the maximum you are willing to pay, you will keep all the money I have given you and I will keep the net.
Under this procedure, it is in your best interest to tell me exactly the maximum you are willing to pay; no more and no less. If you tell me a price that is higher than the maximum you actually want to pay, you will be forced to pay this price if I choose it. If the price you tell me is lower than the maximum you would pay, then if I draw a low price you will not be allowed to buy the nets even if you want to.
Free Nets Condition:
We are interested in finding out how much you value the nets we have given you, and who in your family will use it them if you don't have enough for everyone. We will ask you to tell us the minimum price at which you are willing to sell (one net / one and both nets / one, two, and all three nets). I will then choose a price randomly. If the price you tell me is lower than the price I choose, you will give me the net and I will give you amount of money I have chosen. If the price I choose is lower than the maximum you are willing to pay, you will keep all the money I have given you and I will keep the net.
Under this procedure, it is in your best interest to tell me exactly the minimum you are willing to accept; no more and no less. If you tell me a price that is lower than the minimum you would want to sell for, you will be forced to sell at this price if I choose it. If the price you tell me is higher than the minimum you would pay, then if I draw a high price you may not be allowed to sell the nets even if you want to.
First, we will practice this procedure with other items.
Buying Condition:
One: I will ask you to tell me the maximum price you are willing to pay for one X. I will then choose a price randomly. If the amount you are willing to pay for an X is higher than the price of one X, you will give me the price and I will give you an X. If the amount you are willing to pay for one X is lower than the price of one X, you will keep the money I have given you and I will keep the X.
Two: I will ask you to tell me the maximum price you are willing to pay for one and two X. I will then choose a price randomly. If the amount you are willing to pay for two X is higher than the price of two X, you will give me the price of two X and I will give you two X. If the amount you are willing to pay for two X is lower than the price of two X, but higher than the price of one X, you will give me the price of one X and I will give you one X. If the amount you are willing to pay for one X is lower than the price of one X, you will keep all your money and I will keep the X.
Three: I will ask you to tell me the maximum price you are willing to pay for one, two, and three X. I will then choose a price randomly. If the amount you are willing to pay for three X is higher than the price of three X, you will give me the price of three X and I will give you three X. If the amount you are willing to pay for three X is lower than the price of three X, but higher than the price for two X, you will give me the price of two X and I will give you two X. If the amount you are willing to pay for two X is lower than the price of two X, but higher than the price of one X, you will give me the price of one X and I will give you one X. If the amount you are willing to pay for one X is lower than the price of one X, you will keep all your money and I will keep the X.
Free Nets Condition
One: I will ask you to tell me the minimum price at which you are willing to sell the X I have given you. I will then choose a price randomly. If the value at which you are willing to sell the X is lower than the price of one X, I will give you the price and you will give me your X. If the amount you are willing to pay for one X is lower than the price of one X, you will keep the money I have given you and I will keep the X.
Two: I will ask you to tell me the minimum price at which you would be willing to pay for one and two X. I will then choose a price randomly. If the amount you are willing to pay for two X is higher than the price of two X, you will give me the price of two X and I will give you two X. If the amount you are willing to pay for two X is lower than the price of two X, but higher than the price of one X, you will give me the price of one X and I will give you one X. If the amount you are willing to pay for one X is lower than the price of one X, you will keep all your money and I will keep the X.
